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FROM THE RIGHT TO LIFE TO THE RIGHT TO LIVABILITY:  
RADICALLY RE-APPROACHING ‘LIFE’ IN HUMAN RIGHTS POLITICS 
 
Kathryn McNeilly* 
 
Abstract: This article critically reflects on current mainstream debate on abortion in 
international human rights discourse and the conception of life underpinning it. The 
public health focus on access to safe abortion which has dominated this discourse can 
be detected as committed to a fundamentally liberal idea of bounded and individual 
subjecthood which mirrors the commitments of the liberal right to life more generally. 
However, feminist challenges to this frame seeking to advance wider access to 
reproductive freedoms appear equally underpinned by a liberal conception of life. It is 
asserted that feminists may offer a more radical challenge to the current impasse in 
international debate on abortion by engaging with the concept of livability which 
foregrounds life as an interdependent and conditioned process. The trope of the ‘right to 
livability’ developed in this article presents a means to reposition the relation between 
rights and life and facilitate such radical engagement which better attends to the socio-
political conditions shaping our interdependent living and being.  
 
1.0 INTRODUCTION 
The concept of ‘life’ is one of the most fundamental ideas threading through the 
international human rights corpus. It is specifically enshrined in the right to life, which is 
not only the cardinal human right from which all other rights proceed, but also 
interpellates the ‘human’ subject.1 Traditionally the approach to life taken in human 
rights discourse has been a firmly liberal one, foregrounding an individualised and 
possessive subject. Such a conception of life is central in shaping politico-legal debate at 
the international level and what the discourse and practice of rights can be used to 
achieve in relation to our living and being together. One area demonstrating this is 
international debate on the issue of abortion. Following the traditional, liberal approach 
to life, mainstream debate on abortion in international human rights discourse has been 
shaped by a public health frame which promotes access to safe abortion to prevent 
maternal morbidity and mortality. This frame serves to foreground an atomised, 
bounded subject at the expense of considering reproductive relations and freedoms in a 
more interdependent and complex context. Feminist challenges to this frame advancing 
wider access to abortion provision based upon discourses such as ‘choice’ have been 
largely unsuccessful in rendering a shift in this debate. Feminists have reached this 
impasse because they, like the wider public health frame they seek to challenge, also 
rely upon a claim about human life that obscures the fragility and interdependence 
characterising the human condition.  
In this article I consider how a differing conception of life may be imagined in human 
rights discourse, specifically in the area of reproductive freedoms. I assert that feminists 
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interested in advancing reproductive rights at the level of international human rights 
may do so in a more radical way by looking to the idea of livability.2 This is a concept 
which stems from the work of Judith Butler3 and advances an alternative approach to 
life as an interdependent and conditioned process, displacing the bounded, liberal 
subject. By turning to concerns of livability feminists will not only be working with an 
ontology that captures a more nuanced view of human life and the power that shapes it, 
but will be engaging in a more radical politics which holds potential to meaningfully 
challenge the foundations of current debate. Such an approach would disrupt concepts 
of bounded individualism limiting what can be said and done using the discourse and 
practice of rights, and holds potential for rights to be of use in facilitating more radical 
encounters with life which may be of interest to leftist politics.  
Butler’s discussion of livability4 intersects with many concerns faced by feminists 
engaging with reproductive rights and its present impasse. I seek to build upon these 
intersections by bringing the concept of livability into dialogue with the practice and 
discourse of rights. I assert that an alternative feminist approach to life in international 
human rights debate on abortion can be worked towards through engaging in the 
practice of what I term the ‘right to livability’. This trope restages the relation between 
rights and life beyond what is currently possible in the traditional, liberal right to life and 
its associated discourse through seeking to enforce the egalitarian social obligations 
which exist towards human life, but also to challenge current distributions of livability 
and precarity. The right to livability, a right which comes into being only through its 
practice, retains the utility of rights for feminist work but places their practice on a new 
ontological footing which holds more radical potential to speak to our living and being 
together in the context of precarious, interdependent life.  
2.0  INTERNATIONAL HUMAN RIGHTS DEBATE ON ABORTION AND ITS UNDERPINNINGS 
In order to consider how feminist activism in the area of reproductive rights may 
advance through recourse to a proposed right to livability, we must consider the current 
landscape within which mainstream human rights engagement with abortion takes 
place, and the current liberal discourse on life characterising such engagement. 
International human rights discourse has generally avoided asserting a strong, or 
unified, position on abortion. Accordingly, an internationally recognised ‘right to 
abortion’ does not exist.5 Even the Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of 
Discrimination Against Women does not explicitly recognise abortion in its text. So how 
has abortion come to be engaged at the level of international human rights? How can a 
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liberal conception of life be observed to underpin debate and discussion in this area? 
Moreover, at what point can the theoretical tool of livability productively intervene?  
Attention to reproductive issues within international human rights can be traced to the 
1968 International Human Rights Conference in Teheran where it was officially declared 
that ‘couples have a basic human right to decide freely and responsibly on the number 
and spacing of their children and a right to adequate education and information in this 
respect’.6 This assertion was built upon in two World Population Conferences held in 
Bucharest (1974) and Mexico (1984). The concept of ‘reproductive rights’ gradually 
emerged as a set of rights related to the ability to decide on the number and spacing of 
children, including rights to access birth control, to effective information and sex 
education, to adequate reproductive health care, to make decisions on childbirth, to 
refuse any unwanted medical procedure, and to terminate a pregnancy.7 However, 
during this time reproductive rights were being promoted by two very different 
international movements; the women’s rights movement, focusing on reproductive 
freedom as central to challenging restrictive sex/gender roles, and the population 
movement, which tied issues of reproduction to development concerns as opposed to 
empowerment for women.8 From 1975 the international women’s movement gained 
momentum and feminist participants in the 1984 Mexico Conference sought to strongly 
assert a right to reproductive freedom grounded firmly in notions of bodily autonomy as 
opposed to development or population control.9  
This trend continued and in the 1990s feminist activism to further entrench attention to 
reproductive issues within human rights discourse formed part of the ‘Women’s Rights 
as Human Rights’ movement. 10  Significant during this time was the 1994 Cairo 
Conference on Population and Development. This conference, described as effecting a 
‘paradigm shift’ in relation to reproductive rights,11 lay the foundation for the approach 
human rights engagement with abortion, and the issue of life in relation to this, would 
subsequently take. The Cairo Programme of Action was forged from two years of local, 
national, regional and international preparatory meetings involving feminist groups, 
health professionals, development economists, demographers, environmentalists, faith 
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communities, donors and governments.12 The product of this dialogue was a ‘radically 
different approach’ acknowledging that population concerns could not be separated 
from other economic and social agendas, in particular the need for women’s 
empowerment.13  
However, one exception to the radical significance of the new discourse emerging from 
Cairo was the outcome on abortion.14 During the 1990s abortion was increasingly being 
discussed at the international level as a significant public health concern, given the high 
levels of maternal mortality and morbidity arising from unsafe and clandestine 
abortions.15 The only consensus which could be reached on abortion at Cairo was an 
affirmation that where abortion is legal such abortion should be safe, and where illegal 
women should not die or face morbidity because of illegal or unsafe abortion.16 The 
wider issue of wholesale legalisation was rejected in favour of this public health frame. 
Thus, while the Cairo Conference put abortion on the public agenda in an 
unprecedented way, this was firmly in the sense of a public health problem of unsafe 
abortion.  
The public health frame has since gained wide traction in Treaty Monitoring Bodies, 
International Courts and other international human rights fora.17 Undoubtedly it has 
produced benefits feminist activists and commentators can applaud, both practically 
and in terms of the theoretical development of human rights discourse. For example, 
Joanna Erdman discusses the safe abortion interventions which a public health focus has 
facilitated, including provision of safer-use information on medical abortion to prevent 
the use of more dangerous methods.18 Theoretically, the public health frame has also 
aided in feminist development of rights, the right to life in particular. The focus on safe 
abortion and use of the right to life in prevention of maternal mortality has contributed 
to the reworking of the traditionally narrow liberal conception of this right as restricted 
mainly to situations involving capital punishment.19 Through the public health frame 
feminists have been able to reveal the gendered nature of this right and rework it in new 
ways.  
However, the public health frame represents a compromise, which from the outset 
makes it a less than radical means for advancing feminist positions in relation to 
reproductive rights. Beyond this, the frame has other problematic elements which 
bolster arguments for its contemporary debunking. Despite the opportunity for 
                                                             
12 Roseman and Reichenbach as above at 4-5; Corrêa Sonia, Germain Adrienne and Petchesky 
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15 Cook above note 10 at 73; Zampas Christina and Gher Jamie ‘Abortion as a Human Right – 
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16 Berer above note 14 at 152; Miller and Roseman above note 7 at 104.  
17 Erdman Joanna, ‘Abortion in International Human Rights Law’ in Rowlands Sam (ed) Abortion Care 
Cambridge University Press Cambridge 2014 p 244. 
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Civil and Political Rights and Women’s Rights to Reproductive Health’ (2004) 13 2 Southern California 
Review of Law and Women’s Studies 229 at 244. 
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developing the right to life provided by the public health frame, these problems are 
linked to the close imbrication of the aim of ensuring safe abortion to prevent maternal 
mortality and morbidity and a liberal approach to life embodied in the traditional liberal 
right to life. While extending the right to life to speak to women’s reproductive 
concerns, the public health frame has simultaneously maintained and bolstered this 
right’s liberal conception of the subject.20  
For example, the public health frame’s focus on ensuring safe access to abortion has 
perpetuated a narrow approach to the concept of ‘life’, restricting the discussion which 
human rights can initiate to the physical protection of women’s lives as opposed to 
placing abortion access in a wider community context of gender and reproductive 
relations. This is evidenced in Treaty Monitoring Body work such as General Comment 
28 of the Human Rights Committee. This Comment outlines that when reporting on the 
right to life states should provide information on ‘any measures taken to help women 
prevent unwanted pregnancies’.21 However, a wide interpretation of what this may 
mean is somewhat restricted by the end of this statement which reads ‘and to ensure 
that they do not have to undertake life-threatening clandestine abortions’,22 prioritising 
the protection of bounded physical life. In its Concluding Observations the Committee 
has similarly stressed illegal and clandestine abortions and their links to high rates of 
maternal morality and morbidity,23 as have other Treaty Monitoring Bodies.24 While the 
Committee has made efforts to highlight mental well-being in relation to abortion 
access, 25  the dominant focus on illegal and clandestine abortions nevertheless 
characterises abortion access as being about the protection of life and health as 
possessions of an atomised individual. Human vulnerability in this view is perceived as a 
problem to be solved by human rights rather than, as Illan rua Wall describes it, an 
inherent and immutable wound which quintessentially exposes being,26 and directs us to 
wider interdependent relations. In this respect the public health frame bolsters what 
                                                             
20 See Wicks Elizabeth The Right to Life and Conflicting Interests Oxford University Press Oxford 2010. 
21 UN Human Rights Committee ‘General Comment 28, Equality of Rights Between Men and Women 
(Article 3)’ (2000) UN Doc. CCPR/C/21/Rev.1/Add.10 at para 10. 
22 As above.  
23 UN Human Rights Committee, ‘Concluding Observations Regarding Colombia’ (1 April 1997) 
CCPR/C/79/Add.76 at para 24; ‘Concluding Observations Regarding Ecuador’ (18 August 1998) 
CCPR/C/79/Add.92 at para 11; ‘Concluding Observations Regarding Poland’ (29 July 1999) 
CCPR/C/79/Add.110 at para 11 ‘Concluding Observations Regarding Guatemala’ (27 August 2001) 
CCPR/CO/72/GTM at para 19; and ‘Concluding Observations Regarding Mali’ (16 April 2003) 
CCPR/CO/77/MLI at para 14. 
24 UN Committee on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination Against Women ‘Concluding 
Observations Regarding Azerbaijan’ (14 May 1998) A/53/38/Rev.1 at para. 73; ‘Concluding 
Observations Regarding Belize’ (1 July 1999) A/54/38 at para 56; and ‘Concluding Observations 
Regarding Nicaragua’ (31 July 2001) A/56/38 at para 300-1. UN Committee on the Rights of the Child 
‘Concluding Observations Regarding Chad’ (24 August 1999) CRC/C/15/Add.107 at para 30; 
‘Concluding Observations Regarding Colombia’ (16 October 2000) CRC/C/15/Add.137 at para 48; and 
‘Concluding Observations Regarding Guatemala’ (9 July 2001) CRC/C/15/Add.154 at para 40. UN 
Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights ‘Concluding Observations Regarding Nepal’ (24 
September 2001) E/C.12/1/Add.66 at para 55; and ‘Concluding Observations Regarding Poland’ (19 
December 2002) E/C.12/1/Add.82 at para 51. 
25 KL v Peru (1153/2003) CCPR/C/85/D/1153/2003 (2005); 13 IHRR 355 (2006). 
26 Wall Illan rua ‘On Pain and the Sense of Human Rights’ (2008) 29 Australian Feminist Law Journal 53 
at 67. 
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Wall sees as ‘human rights set[ting] itself up as that which is to prevent suffering, or in 
the most legal of manners, that which provides a “remedy” for suffering’.27  
The problematic liberal conception of life which the public health frame bolsters can 
also be detected in the frame’s emphasis on the relation between individual life and the 
state. In recent decades an array of litigation adjudicating on safe and legal access to 
abortion as a public health issue has proliferated within the UN, Inter-American and 
European systems. 28  This body of case law has focused on scrutiny of state 
implementation of abortion law, the standards and regulations of abortion access and 
official discretion to deny or obstruct access to lawful abortion services.29 The result is a 
technical focus on the healthcare obligations of a state to its citizens and a 
reinforcement of the strict vertical remit of human rights. This scrutiny is no doubt 
valuable, and human rights are indeed intended to protect individual lives in relation to 
the state. But this approach forecloses a wider consideration of human lives in 
interdependent relations by foregrounding the individual-state relation as of primary 
importance.30 The public health frame’s dominant focus on this relation distracts from a 
potentially wider use of rights to discuss reproductive relations more generally and to 
consider the issue of abortion in a more socio-political way beyond the relation between 
the bounded individual, her life and health, and the state alone.  
Given these problems, how have feminist activists and commentators responded to the 
public health frame? Sonia Corrêa, Adrienne Germain and Rosalind Petchesky note that 
the ambivalence and gaps in accords such as the Cairo Programme for Action are the 
result of political conditions at the time and that the feminist movement in 1994 lacked 
the strength to address access to abortion as a human rights issue in and of itself. As 
such, the result of Cairo and the subsequent strategy of advancing access to safe 
abortion as a public health issue were, for Corrêa, Germain and Petchesky, the best 
outcomes which could be achieved.31 However, in the two decades since Cairo, feminist 
insistence on the importance of access to abortion on wider socio-economic grounds 
still has not enjoyed mainstream attention. Thus, contemporary feminist engagement 
with rights and reproductive freedoms continues to focus on widening the remit of the 
public health frame in the contemporary landscape.32  
One recent example of such engagement took place in March 2014, leading up to the 
20-year review of the Cairo Programme of Action, when feminist and women’s 
organisations drafted and called for a signing of the Airlie Declaration for Safe Legal 
                                                             
27 As above.  
28 Erdman above note 17 at 249. 
29 See for example, LMR v Argentina Communication (2011) No 1608/2007 UN Doc. 
CCPR/C/101/D/1608/2007 (Human Rights Committee); X and XX v Colombia MC-270/09 Inter-Am 
C.H.R. (2011); Pauline Ramirez v Mexico Case 161-02 Report no. 21/07 Inter-Am C.H.R. Friendly 
Settlement (2007); A, B and C v Ireland (2010) (App No 25579/05) 53 EHRR 13 (European Court of 
Human Rights); Tysiac v Poland (2007) (App No 5410/03) 45 EHRR 42 (European Court of Human 
Rights); R. R. v Poland (2011) (App No 27617/040) 53 EHRR 31 (European Court of Human Rights); P. 
and S. v Poland (2012) (App No 57375/08) (European Court of Human Rights).  
30 For an alternative reading see Timmer Alexandra ‘A Quiet Revolution: Vulnerability in the European 
Court of Human Rights’ in Fineman Martha Albertson and Grear Anna (eds) Vulnerability: Reflections 
on a New Ethical Foundation for Law and Politics Ashgate Farnham 2013 p 147 at 156. 
31 Corrêa, Germain and Petchesky above note 12 at 110-111. See also Berer above note 14 at 162; 
Miller and Roseman above note 7 at 102.   
32 Zampas and Gher above note 15 at 255. 
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Abortion. Ipas, one organisation sponsoring the Declaration, described the move as 
aiming to ‘repeal criminal abortion laws, ensure universal access to services’ and address 
the slow progress since Cairo.33 The discourse of this challenge to the public health 
frame was grounded firmly within the language of choice, the Declaration opening with 
the statement that ‘we believe in a world where every woman and girl has the right to 
make decisions about her body, her health and her future’. While Ipas report some 
success in pursuing this message among delegates to the 47th session of the United 
Nations Commission on Population and Development in April 2014,34 the report from 
the session does not reflect a move beyond the Cairo position.35 This recent example 
demonstrates the impasse that feminist activists appear to be stuck in regarding 
advancement of wide access to abortion and human rights both in terms of the difficulty 
of moving beyond the public health frame, but also the impotency of current feminist 
approaches in radically troubling debate in this area.  
While advancing wider access to abortion on grounds of equality or choice may 
challenge the public health frame, to date none of these resources have been successful 
in moving beyond it. As Fiona Jenkins elaborates, such movements focusing on the 
discourse of ‘choice’ are ‘no less inscribed in a social field of hetero-normative 
assumptions… although they may be “progressive” relative to conservative views, [they] 
are hardly radically transformative of social and sexual fields of recognition and 
power’.36 Indeed, such ideas are often as equally mired in the liberal frames they seek to 
trouble, precluding deeper challenge to prevailing discourse.37 Feminist attempts to 
move beyond the public health frame using such concepts often appear equally 
underpinned by a bounded, sovereign subject familiar from the traditional right to life 
threading through the public health frame. This underpinning means feminist attempts 
to move beyond the discourse of public health still misunderstand and obscure the 
interdependency characterising the human condition, rendering wider radical social 
transformation in relation to discourses of life, gender and reproductive relations 
impossible.38   
Is it possible to stage a deeper, more radical feminist challenge to the current 
parameters of debate on abortion in international human rights discourse by advancing 
an alternative conception of living and being, our lives together and where reproductive 
freedoms may figure in this? This would involve a move even more radical than 
translation of the right to life to speak to gendered concerns and power relations 
previously invisible. It would involve a fundamental troubling of what human rights can 
do and say in relation to human life, moving beyond the basic conception of bounded 
life, dislodging the liberal subject advanced in the cardinal right to life and envisaging life 
                                                             
33 Ipas Website http://www.ipas.org/en/News/2014/March/Global-leaders-sign-global-declaration-
for-safe-legal-abortion.aspx Accessed 12 February 2015. 
34 Ipas Website http://www.ipas.org/en/News/2014/April/Governments-gatheredat-the-United-
Nations-call-for-access-to-safe-abortion-and-new-efforts.aspx Accessed 12 February 2015. 
35 Commission on Population and Development ‘Report on the Forty-Seventh Session (26th April 2013 
and 7-11 April 2014)’ E/2014/25-E/CN.9/2014/7 at para 12 
36 Jenkins Fiona ‘Queering Foetal Life: Between Butler and Berlant’ (2009) 30 1 Australian Feminist 
Law Journal 63 at 72 (emphasis in original). 
37 McNeilly Kathryn ‘Gendered Violence and International Human Rights: Thinking Non-discrimination 
Beyond the Sex Binary’ (2014) 22 3 Feminist Legal Studies 263 at 271-273.  
38 For previous feminist critique of the right to choose and the individualism it advances see, for 
example, Petchesky Rosalind ‘Reproductive Freedom: Beyond “A Woman’s Right to Choose”’ (1980) 5 
4 Signs 661. 
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as it relates to issues such as reproduction, gender and being together in a way which 
starts with the inherent vulnerability and interdependency of human life.  
A significant body of scholarship has challenged the possessive individualism of liberal 
rights and their grounding in a bounded subject and a solution-focused approach to 
human vulnerability which obscures life’s wider interdependency. For example, Bryan 
Turner and Peadar Kirby have both considered vulnerability and discourses of rights and 
globalisation.39 Within a feminist framework, Martha Fineman and Anna Grear have 
problematised the traditional assumptions of human rights by using Fineman’s theory of 
vulnerability which critiques the ‘autonomous’ subject of liberal law and politics and the 
structural arrangements they support, and Grear’s theorisation of ‘embodied 
vulnerability’ as a foundation of international human rights subjectivity.40 For Fineman 
and Grear, vulnerability ‘positions individuals in relation to each other as human beings 
and also suggests an appropriate relationship of shared responsibility as between state, 
societal institutions and individuals’.41  
However, in the present discussion seeking to offer feminists more radical means to 
move beyond the current impasse characterising debate on abortion within 
international human rights discourse I would like to turn to the works of Judith Butler. 
Butler also fundamentally opposes liberal forms of bounded, possessional subjectivity, 
instead viewing all life as inherently vulnerable and interdependent.42 It is Butler’s 
concept of livability within this conception of human life which I believe is most useful to 
feminists working on reproductive freedoms, intersecting with the concerns the current 
international debate on abortion poses for contemporary feminist work. More than this, 
when placed in conversation with the discourse and practice of rights, the concept of 
livability provides the starting point for a vision of feminist interventions which go 
beyond the liberal subject and allow for a repositioning of the relation between rights 
and life in such interventions via a trope I am calling ‘the right to livability’.  
3.0 THE LIVABILITY FRAMEWORK  
3.1 The Concept of Livability  
While livability is a concept only explicitly engaged in Butler’s work since the early 
2000s, commentators have characterised all of Butler’s corpus as centred around the 
concern of ‘how can we have more livable and viable lives?’43 A concern with livability 
stems from Butler’s view of life as precarious – ‘lives are by definition precarious: they 
can be expunged at will or by accident; their persistence is in no sense guaranteed’.44 In 
                                                             
39 Turner Bryan Vulnerability and Human Rights Pennsylvania State University Pennsylvania 2006; 
Kirby Peadar ‘Vulnerability and Globalisation: Mediating Impacts on Society’ (2011) 2 1 Journal of 
Human Rights and the Environment 86. 
40 Fineman Martha Albertson and Grear Anna (eds) Vulnerability: Reflections on a New Ethical 
Foundation for Law and Politics Ashgate Farnham 2013. See also Fineman Martha Albertson ‘The 
Vulnerable Subject: Anchoring Equality in the Human Condition’ (2008) 20 1 Yale Journal of Law and 
Feminism 1. 
41 Fineman and Grear as above at 3. 
42 Butler Judith The Psychic Life of Power: Theories in Subjection Stanford University Press Stanford 
1997 p 8; Butler Precarious Life above note 3 at 26-29. 
43 Loizidou Elena ‘Butler and Life: Law, Sovereignty, Power’ in Carver Terrell and Chambers Samuel 
(eds) Judith Butler’s Precarious Politics Routledge New York 2008 p 145 at 145; Lloyd Moya Judith 
Butler: From Norms to Politics Polity Cambridge 2007 p 134. 
44 Butler Frames above note 3 at 25.  
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contrast to the liberal perception of life detectable in the traditional right to life and the 
public health frame above, precariousness implies ‘living socially, the fact that one’s life 
is always in some sense in the hands of the other. It implies exposure both to those we 
know and to those we do not know; a dependency on people we know, or barely know, 
or know not at all’.45 This state of precariousness is an inherent and ineradicable part of 
human nature; all are defined by the possibility of destruction and injury.  
However, precariousness is not simply an existential condition of individuals; it is a social 
condition from which clear political demands and principles emerge.46 Social and 
political organisations and other institutions have developed to maximise 
precariousness for some and minimise it for others.47 So while all life is equally defined 
by precariousness, not all lives are equally precarious. The state of enhanced 
precariousness produced by the operation of power is what Butler terms ‘precarity’; the 
‘politically induced condition in which certain populations suffer from failing social and 
economic networks of support and become differentially exposed to injury, violence, 
and death’.48 Experiences of precarity impose certain obligations upon us – to ask about 
the conditions under which it becomes possible to apprehend a life as precarious and to 
consider ways in which precarity can be reduced so that the highest possible persistence 
and flourishing of life in its precariousness may be promoted.  
To meaningfully work towards and consider the flourishing of human life in such 
contexts a new ontology is required. Engaging with the ineradicable condition of 
precariousness involves disavowing a focus on individualism and the protection of life in 
and of itself and draws attention to the conditions which maintain life, those conditions 
which enhance or reduce precariousness. It is in considering the conditions of life - what 
kinds of conditions need to be promoted to enhance the flourishing and persistence of 
life - that the question of livability arises and that a departure from liberal conceptions 
of life may be pursued. ‘Livability’ emerges as the ability to sustain a viable life in 
conditions of inherent precariousness and the socio-political operation of precarity. The 
possibility of a livable life takes place within the realm of basic socio-economic 
conditions of physical persistence but also within the realm of intelligibility; of who 
within contingent socio-political landscapes is recognisable as a subject capable of living 
a life that counts.49  
The concept of livability has been engaged in various ways by Butler to stage critical 
interventions in relation to socio-political discourses on life – for example, in relation to 
immigrant populations, Palestinian lives and lesbian, gay, bisexual and transgender lives. 
Less prominent, however, is the way in which Butler directly utilises the idea of livability 
to radically challenge how the concept of ‘life’ is thought in relation to abortion. While 
by no means asserting a fully formed or fixed approach to political debate on abortion, 
this direct engagement can be thought as a starting point capable of development to 
signpost an alternative feminist approach to theorising and engaging politically with this 
issue. This is one that supports an alternative role for ‘life’ but also, I believe, in its 
development can support an alternative role for rights, and the relation between the 
two, in this debate. 
                                                             
45 Butler Frames above note 3 at 14. 
46 Butler Frames above note 3 at xxv. 
47 Butler Frames above note 3 at 2-3. 
48 Butler Frames above note 3 at 25. 
49 Butler above note 2 at 39. 
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3.2 Livability and ‘Life’ in Debate on Abortion 
 
Direct engagement with abortion using livability’s reframing of ‘life’ arises mainly in 
Butler’s essay ‘The Question of Social Transformation’, published as part of Undoing 
Gender,50 and in the introductory chapter to Frames of War.51 In these discussions the 
livability framework advances a move beyond focus of the abortion debate on when life 
is biologically viable – and the liberal individualism which surrounds such framing of 
debate – and towards a more radical approach to ‘life’ as a conditioned process. Butler 
is keen to stave off misinterpretations of this concern with enhancing livable life, stating 
that ‘some of my opponents may well argue that if one takes as a paramount value the 
“extension of norms that support viable life”, it might follow… that the “unborn child” 
should be valued above all. This is not my view, and not my conclusion’.52 Her argument 
against this conclusion involves questioning the term ‘life’, disputing its meaning as 
clear, as if we know what life requires and demands. It is her assertion that the societal 
approach to ‘life’ in general, and in the abortion debate in particular, has been divorced 
from questions of what normative conditions must be socially fulfilled for livable life to 
be secured. It is Butler’s aim ‘to retrieve thinking about life for the left and to make use 
of this framework of precarious life to sustain a strong feminist position on reproductive 
freedoms’.53 
Discussion along these lines in ‘The Question of Social Transformation’ and Frames of 
War offers resources which may be of use to feminist activists and scholars seeking to 
radically disrupt the liberal discourses of life which restrict what it is possible to hear and 
see in relation to abortion in international human rights discourse. In both these 
locations Butler is keen to distinguish between life as a minimum biological condition, a 
possession of a liberal individual as per the public health frame and feminist responses 
to it based on discourses of ‘choice’, and a wider idea of life as a conditioned process. In 
addition, given the interdependent nature of life, egalitarian obligations exist to attend 
to these conditions.54 Society and its institutions have positive obligations to provide the 
basic supports that minimise precariousness and maximise livability. 55  Thus, the 
considerations guiding debate on abortion following a livability approach should not rest 
on liberal conceptions of bounded, autonomous life but always on the conditions 
sustaining (gendered) life and how they may be socially fulfilled, where ‘life’ is 
something that requires these conditions in order to become livable and grievable.56  
Moreover, livability’s rejection of recourse to biological individualism, and its grounding 
in commitments to the liberal bounded subject in favour of an attention to the 
precariousness of all life, renders untenable a right to life in the sense advanced by the 
public health frame. Not only is life a conditioned process as opposed to a possession of 
a bounded individual to be protected, but because all life is precarious we cannot say in 
advance that there is a right to life for any living thing as it is impossible to ward off all 
                                                             
50 Butler above note 2 at 204-231. 
51 Butler Frames above note 3 at 15-23. See also Butler Judith and Schneider Nathan ‘A Carefully 
Crafted Fuck You: Nathan Schneider Interviews Judith Butler’ (2010) Guernica n. pag. 
52 As above. 
53 Butler Frames above note 3 at 15-16. 
54 Butler Frames above note 3 at 14. 
55 Butler Frames above note 3 at 21-22. 
56 Butler Frames above note 3 at 23. 
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possible sources and processes of degeneration and death.57 An ontology which views 
individual life as capable of protection from vulnerability and injury, legal protection in 
particular, is one which fails to recognise that the precariousness characterising life 
places such individualism into question.58 Instead of individualising subjects as rights 
holders whose life must be protected, we must acknowledge that ‘there is no life 
without the conditions of life that variably sustain life, and those conditions are 
pervasively social, establishing not the discrete ontology of the person, but rather the 
interdependency of persons’.59 The livability framework thus encourages unpredictable 
and highly contextualised democratic debate on what life requires to be viable and 
flourishing, and on how these conditions may be worked towards in particular locations, 
the outcome of which can never be predicted in advance.  
In thinking about what the livability framework means for contemporary feminist 
engagement with abortion, Jenkins outlines that a livability approach can be 
distinguished from the ‘metaphysical realism characteristic of Pro-Life positions’ as well 
as ‘the countering metaphysical positivism of many Pro-Choice positions that would 
directly deny humanity to the foetus’.60 Located outside this binary, a livability approach 
opens up the very question of belonging, of the social conditions through which ‘life’ is 
produced and sustained, to critical interrogation. It is this assertion which I would like to 
draw out here, articulating how the livability framework may suggest an alternative 
feminist perspective on abortion which goes beyond the liberalism characterising both 
the public health frame and feminist choice-based challenges to it, and may also point 
towards a new role for the practice and discourse of rights in this area.  
3.3 Reimagining Abortion Politics, Reimagining Rights 
 
To summarise the ground covered so far, an approach to political engagement with 
abortion based on the concept of livability should stimulate a differing conceptualisation 
of ‘life’ which resists the binary of ‘pro-life’ and ‘pro-choice’, and foregrounds societal 
obligations towards the socio-cultural conditions which encourage the flourishing of 
human life. This politics can be read as pointing towards the need to consciously move 
beyond such binarised discourse and debunk the debate’s grounding in a liberal subject 
through a rethinking of the terms of political debate itself. How can this approach be 
thought through further to work towards a new feminist politics of life and rights? In 
order to demonstrate what this may mean, it is useful to refer to another location in 
Butler’s corpus where a similar imperative is urged. In the context of debate on gay 
marriage Butler advances the asking of new and different questions about what current 
structuring of political debate forecloses, questions which are themselves foreclosed, in 
order to encourage political debate beyond binarised parameters of ‘pro’ and ‘against’.61 
In advancing the need to re-appropriate the term ‘life’ in political debate on abortion 
the framework of livability can be thought of as aiming towards a similar goal. 
A feminist approach to the issue of abortion which aims to go beyond the current terms 
of the debate and instead open up discussion on life and what it requires to flourish in 
particular contexts might begin by asking questions such as ‘what kinds of choices are 
                                                             
57 Butler Frames above note 3 at 18. 
58 Butler Frames above note 3 at 19.  
59 As above. 
60 Jenkins above note 36 at 81. 
61 Butler above note 2 at 102-130. 
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made possible by social configurations of life?’; ‘which lives count reproductively?’; 
‘what does current discourse make it possible to see and hear about reproductive 
lives?’; ‘what do humans require in contingent locations to live viably – in the socio-
political sense – to do more than just persist?’; ‘what do our gendered lives currently 
look like together?’ Resisting either ‘pro-life’ or ‘pro-choice’ positions and the focus on 
bounded, liberal life defining debate at the level of international human rights, such 
questions interrupt the very foundations of current debate. 
Raised through engagement with livability as a socio-political imperative, these 
questions are aimed towards wider social transformation, foregrounding a new ontology 
of precarious life not graspable by political debate as it currently stands. As discussed 
above in relation to the Airlie Declaration, within contemporary abortion politics even 
pro-choice feminist movements in favour of enhanced reproductive freedoms for 
women cannot draw attention to, never mind ultimately achieve, the kind of critical 
questioning and social transformation which the livability framework envisages. Thus, 
while an approach grounded in the politics of livability will not be prescriptive about 
what a reformed feminist politics on reproductive freedoms would look like, it is clear 
that such a politics starts from the asking of new questions about ‘life’ and sustaining 
(gendered) debate surrounding these questions. From this, a new way for feminists to 
engage in, and interrupt, political debate on abortion emerges, and space may be 
opened to consider life, and its gendered dimensions, in terms of the conditions – social, 
economic, political – which sustain it.  
This rethinking of debate on abortion using the framework of livability may also involve 
a re-engagement with the use of rights discourse and what the practice of rights can do 
or say in relation to concerns of ‘life’. Feminist engagement with rights in a sense of 
upholding liberal notions of bounded individualism and sovereign choice is problematic 
from the perspective of livability.62 As Jenkins outlines, pro-choice discourse currently 
seeks to ‘inscribe women within the order of rights-bearing adult citizenry’ and, in doing 
so, risks ‘avoiding a necessary critique of the hetero-normative structuring of the space 
of rights’.63 Thus, pro-choice use of rights to signify women as autonomous or choosing 
rights bearers is not, in and of itself, a strategy or a form of political engagement which 
is sufficiently transformative from the perspective of livability; it cannot disrupt 
attention from liberal conceptions of life. Advancing a politics of livability, of questioning 
and experimentation necessarily involves rejecting liberal rights as insufficiently radical 
as they are currently used in mainstream debate on abortion. 
This does not necessarily mean that work towards questioning and experimentation in 
political debate on abortion from the perspective of livability need rule out engagement 
with rights altogether.64 Yet, much work is needed in imagining specific ways in which 
                                                             
62 For wider feminist critiques of rights in the abortion debate see Karlan Pamela and Ortiz Daniel ‘In a 
Diffident Voice: Relational Feminism, Abortion Rights and the Feminist Legal Agenda’ (1993) 87 3 
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University Press Cambridge, Mass. 1987 p 93-102; Ruhl Lealle Disarticulating Liberal Subjectivities: 
Abortion and Fetal Protection’ (2002) 28 1 Feminist Studies 37 at 37-38; Smyth Lisa ‘Feminism and 
Abortion Politics: Choice, Rights, and Reproductive Freedom’ (2002) 25 3 Women’s Studies 
International Forum 335. 
63 Jenkins above note 36 at 85. 
64 In her work Butler does express a scepticism regarding the use of rights, but does not appear to 
advance a wholesale rejection of rights. See, in relation to her scepticism, Butler above note 2 at 20; 
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rights discourse may be useful, and may facilitate a more radical debate beyond 
liberalism. In what follows below, I build upon Butler to contribute to such imaginings by 
combining the politics of livability and the politics of rights. Following discussion above, 
rights can be of use only to the extent that they help to trouble debate on abortion by 
opening up questions based upon the inevitable precariousness of all life and the 
conditions of life which must be attended to. Because livability is the concept which 
holds potential to transform the stagnation of political debate and encourage a crisis in 
how human life is perceived, the discourse of rights can be viewed as productive where 
it can be used to draw attention towards and stimulate debate on concerns of livability. 
This would not only facilitate a new perspective on the abortion debate but also, 
potentially, a re-engagement with what rights can do or say in relation to life from the 
perspective of radical politics more generally.  
How can rights be directed towards this new use? How may the discourse and practice 
of rights be harnessed to engage with life in a new way? What I propose is that a radical 
approach to ‘life’ – one which holds potential to reformulate political debate on 
abortion in the manner outlined above and offers a new future for the concept of ‘life’ in 
rights discourse – can be envisaged by developing the concept of a ‘right to livability’. 
This concept is grounded in livability’s drive towards social transformation and seeks to 
engage the politics of rights to facilitate a questioning and experimentation which 
troubles current normative conceptions of life. This contrasting account can reimagine a 
human rights approach to life beyond liberalism, pointing rights and their politics 
towards an alternative ontological footing.  
The concept of a ‘right to livability’ encourages activist politics, such as feminist 
engagements with abortion, to assert a claim to more livable life in a way which 
facilitates political engagement with both the precariousness of life and the conditions 
which constitute and sustain life. This practice has potential to interrupt current 
impasses in political debate, to foreground the experiences of those living in heightened 
conditions of precarity, and to open up debate on ways in which this may be addressed 
and concepts of life in particular contexts thought anew. In this respect the discourse 
and practice of the ‘right to livability’ holds potential to challenge and move beyond the 
dominant public health frame’s liberal focus on the protection of life, while also 
eschewing the liberalism implicit in contrasting assertions of choice to justify universal 
legalisation. The right to livability allows feminists to engage in a more radical politics 
which pursues access to abortion because it sustains and attends to the conditions 
allowing livable life in gendered contexts.  
4.0 THE RIGHT TO LIVABILITY  
How might we further conceptualise the idea of a ‘right to livability’? Butler’s critique of 
the right to life in Frames of War asserts that a more radical approach to life must 
involve embracing the social obligations attached to the conditions which sustain life, 
and this account of obligation aims to facilitate political engagement with the unequal 
recognition of lives. This two-pronged assertion emerging from Butler’s reworking of 
‘life’ can be used in conceptualising a ‘right to livability’. Engaging the practice of rights 
to work towards more livable life by using the right to livability involves, firstly, enforcing 
the egalitarian obligations towards life and, secondly, challenging current conditions of 
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livability and precarity as they emerge within socio-political contexts. These two 
elements are explored in more detail below. It is important to note, however, that the 
right to livability is not outlined here as an alternative positive right which aims to 
substitute the current liberal right to life. It is not a right in the sense of an already 
existing protection which may be claimed, but a right which comes into being through its 
assertion. Asserting that certain subject lives have a right to enhanced conditions of 
livability, via the two limbs outlined above, works towards performatively bringing these 
enhanced conditions into being. The radical potential of the right to livability in this 
sense is not contained in its content - indeed the ‘content’ of this right cannot be fixed 
and is itself what is to be opened for political debate - but in its practice. 
To articulate further the resources which ground this trope, in terms of the first limb of 
the right to livability - working towards the enforcement of life’s egalitarian obligations - 
the interdependency of persons which characterises precarious life creates not only 
ethical obligations towards the other who is constitutive of the self, but social 
obligations too. Moving focus from life itself to the conditions which sustain 
interdependent life prompts a rethinking of the right to life where there is no final 
protection against destruction and where social bonds compel us to secure the 
conditions for livable lives on egalitarian grounds, providing basic supports which seek to 
minimise precariousness and maximise livability in egalitarian ways.65 While no doubt 
seeking to leave substantive content of these obligations open to contextual political 
debate, Butler does provide some outline of what these egalitarian social obligations 
central to an approach based on livability may entail. For example, she outlines in 
Frames of War that these obligations should pervade social policy involving issues such 
as shelter, work, food, medical care and legal status.66 Whereas the liberal right to life 
currently fails to engage with the conditions of life and place focus upon such egalitarian 
obligations, it is possible that the discourse of rights could be usefully reimagined as a 
vehicle for debating and seeking to better fulfil such obligations which society and 
social/political institutions have to life as livable life. In this way, the practice of the right 
to livability firstly involves questioning, (re)claiming or enforcing some kind of egalitarian 
obligation to life which is currently inadequately fulfilled – not as something to which 
subjects have a right in the liberal sense, but in the sense of interdependent life where 
the life of the other is inherently caught up with one’s own and creates an ethical 
relation between the two.    
As assertion of such positive social obligations aims to intervene in current distributions 
of precariousness which recognise some lives as more livable than others, a second task 
can be envisaged for the practice of the right to livability.67 Asserting a right to livability 
may also be used as a critical tool to challenge current distributions of precarity. 
Through enforcing societal obligations towards lives currently restricted or experiencing 
heightened precarity, the practice of the right to livability fundamentally involves 
speaking back to the power relations grounding human life and its viability. By enforcing 
or exploring the societal obligations which exist to ensure livable life opportunity 
simultaneously arises to interrupt or initiate debate on current distributions of precarity 
and thereby redraw the boundaries of human life itself. The contingent assertion of a 
right to livability by those lives whose livability is restricted by current socio-political 
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discourses will also necessarily involve exposing the alterity within dominant discourses 
of livable life, using this alterity to rework such discourses beyond their current limits.  
The right to livability, therefore, comes into being through asserting a claim to 
egalitarian obligations to sustain life where such conditions are currently restricted, and 
challenges current discourses of livable life through this practice. Fundamentally, this 
concept poses a new relation between the discourse of rights and the concept of life. As 
a trope the right to livability retains the utility and political significance of rights and 
rights claiming, but bases the practice on an alternative ontological footing. Life comes 
into sight not as a possession of atomised rights holders to be protected, but as a 
conditioned and political process, something inherently vulnerable, open to differential 
conditions of precarity, with this precarity demanding a response grounded in the inter-
related and ek-static nature of our lives. In this way, the right to livability uses the 
language of rights to draw attention to concerns of livability, altering what the discourse 
of rights can be used to reveal and enforce in relation to life as not a possession but a 
condition of dispossession.68 The right to livability does not exist as a guarantee of these 
obligations to facilitate livable life per se, but as a mechanism to begin discussion on 
them anew and so challenge current distributions of precarity. In this repositioning of 
what rights can do in relation to livable life, the discourse of rights appears as a 
mechanism of working towards social transformation, reimagining life and our lives 
together towards potentially productive ends.  
As an example of what such action may look like we may think of Butler’s engagement 
with Spanish-speaking immigrants publicly singing the American national anthem in 
their own language in California during May 2006.69 In this singing these subjects were 
asserting rights of citizenship, rights of freedom of assembly and speech which they 
officially lacked. Butler comments on this action in the following terms: 
What kind of public performance was this street singing? Their aim was to 
petition the government to allow them to become citizens. But what was the 
way in which they made their petition? Indeed, what kind of performative 
exercise was this singing? They were exercising the right of free assembly 
without having that right. That right belongs to citizens. So, they were 
asserting a right they did not have in order to make the case, publicly, that 
they should have that very right.70  
This was exactly the kind of action which asserted a right to livability – enforcing social, 
economic and political obligations which exist towards immigrant lives and in doing so 
challenging the enhanced precarity these lives experience within discourses of American 
nation and citizenship. The right to livability framework would encourage an explicit 
couching of this performative political action in the language of rights, labelling it as part 
of the practice of rights thought anew. The right to livability indeed allows the 
performativity of rights to come into view, moving from contested debates surrounding 
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personhood, or the protection of bounded ideas of personhood, to allow the practice of 
rights to be viewed as ineradicably political. In contrast to the liberal right to life and its 
attempts in contexts such as the public health frame to depoliticise rights and their 
relation to life, the right to livability acknowledges that rights can never overcome 
politics. In this way, the right to livability framework encourages an entirely different 
view of the practice of rights, one that is more open about the political nature of this 
activity. How in particular may the concept and practice of the right to livability aid 
feminists interested in reproductive freedoms and help challenge or work through the 
impasses into which human rights debate on abortion has fallen?  
Beginning with feminist activism at the local level, feminists concerned about the 
gendered impact of particular contextualised abortion provision on possibilities for 
gendered life may undertake actions couched in the language of the right to livability. 
For example, protests, vigils, staged takings of abortion medication and similar action 
protesting against restrictive access to abortion provision may be articulated as 
asserting a right to livability. Such political actions not only seek to enforce egalitarian 
social obligations towards women and their reproductive capacity, which may include 
access to abortion where flourishing life requires it, but also challenge current 
(gendered) discourses on which lives are livable. Reframing these actions in such a way 
may thus abandon the liberal discourse of choice, bodily autonomy and rights, instead 
using rights language which is grounded in an approach to life as a conditionsed, and 
precarious, process. This could open up debate on livable life in a way not previously 
possible. While such feminist action need not rely on the language of rights, consciously 
undertaking these actions under the guise of the right to livability holds potential to re-
stage what rights discourse can do and say in this debate, what the politics of rights 
looks like and, potentially, offers resources to rethink rights discourse at the level of 
international human rights politics also.  
In turn, feminist activism at the international level may draw upon and mirror this 
repositioning of rights and the concept of life engaged through the right to livability 
framework. This would involve abandoning the search for a way beyond the public 
health frame through recourse to a discourse of choice and engaging in a more 
fundamental reframing of debate through asking the questions which stem from a 
feminist livability approach abortion as outlined above - ‘what kinds of choices are made 
possible by social configurations of life?’, ‘which lives count reproductively?’, etc. Asking 
these questions may present international feminist activism opportunities to explore 
and promote rights-based approaches to reproductive freedom which do not abandon 
the focus on women’s empowerment, but place this within a context which is 
accompanied by a struggle for a conception of the self as invariably in community, 
affected by cultures of precarity and requiring of socio-political conditions to flourish.  
In working towards such interruptions to current mainstream debate on abortion 
feminist activists at the international level are undertaking the work of the right to 
livability also – using the practice of rights at the international level to focus on 
attending to the conditions that facilitate life – and in doing so are working towards 
opening up debate on life, reproduction and gender in a way which holds greater 
potential to challenge current distributions of gendered precarity. A repositioning of the 
relation between rights and life which the right to livability framework promotes, 
therefore, may involve and interlink reappropriation of the language and practice of 
rights at local and international levels. Through such a holistic approach and broad 
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spectrum of feminist activity, all focused on engaging questions of livability, 
opportunities emerge to engage with the issue of abortion in a more radical way and 
work towards social transformation which starts with displacing the liberal subject.  
5.0 CONCLUSION   
This article has sought to imagine the workings of an alternative approach to life in the 
discourse and practice of human rights, one which poses a new relation between the 
two. In the context of international human rights debate on abortion, liberal discourses 
of bounded and possessive individualism currently limit debate. The trope of the right to 
livability offers feminist activists means to engage in a more radical politics of rights that 
holds the potential to disrupt these discourses, and move beyond the current impasse 
into which international human rights debate on abortion has fallen. This move begins at 
the local level, by appropriating what it is possible to say, do and think in relation to 
abortion and rights based upon the livability concerns of women facing restrictive and 
restricting situations of reproductive freedom. Building alternative uses and practices of 
rights at the local level in such a way may be part of a wider challenge to how rights 
have developed as universal concepts at the international level, offering new 
opportunities to look at international rights discourse anew as inherently unfixed and 
open to future development. Using the practice of the right to livability to stage new 
encounters with the concept of life is one step in working towards radicalising the 
politics and practice of rights in a way which may allow rights to go beyond their current 
liberal limitations and facilitate more radical encounters with life and its viability in 
particular socio-political, and gendered, contexts.  
While the issue of reproductive rights has been the focus for discussion above, a 
livability approach is applicable to a wide range of issues and is a flexible tool holding 
much potential for wider leftist politics and activism to deepen debate on life as a 
contextualised and conditioned process. The right to livability in its two-limbed form not 
only provides a framework which leftist politics may consciously engage in organising 
political action, but by restaging the relation between rights and life also allows leftist 
politics to retain a use for the politically powerful discourse of rights. Through such a 
rethinking of what rights can be used to do, say and achieve, the discourse of rights may 
be envisaged beyond its current liberal restrictions and emerge as an additional tool 
which can radicalise debate on a range of issues pertaining to the question of our lives 
together. 
Predictably, the right to livability can offer no grand solutions as to the way in which the 
concept of life must be re-engaged in particular contexts. The question of life, its 
demands and obligations must be kept open and locally responsive. Any challenge to 
cultures of precarity, any journey of dispossession by the demands of precarious life will 
be localised and unpredictable and in this respect the right to livability offers only the 
tools to initiate debate. Yet it is this process of working through unpredictability which 
holds radical possibilities and carves out space for social transformation. Through 
utilising the practice of rights to stage unpredictable, uncontrollable and fundamentally 
troubling critical questioning from the perspective of livability, leftist politics may 
discover ways to interrupt liberal discourses of bounded and possessive individualism 
and allow us to radically re-approach life anew.  
 
